COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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" ..... of rascals, who gloss over their treasons to their country by high-sounding declarations; " raising one hand with energetic enthusiasm, vowing their eternal vengeance on the French tyrant; while " the other is actively employed in rummaging the Public Pocket."——POOR WATCHMAKER'S LETTER.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPAIN.——I have, for some time past, left off the title, "*Spanish Revolution*," because I perceived, that nothing worthy of the name of revolution was intended. I do not say, that the reverses, which the Spaniards have experienced, have proceeded wholly from their new Junta having discovered no disposition to suffer any change to take place in the form or system of the government, or to cause a radical reform of abuses; but, it cannot be denied, that it was, by many persons besides myself, feared, that, unless the people of Spain were let completely loose; unless they were convinced, that the war was *for themselves*, and not for any *single person* or *single family*, they would not make much exertion against the French. The example of other nations was added to the reason of the case, in order to convince the public, that such would be the effect of obstinately adhering to a war in the name of Ferd nand VII; but, the hirelings of the press vociferated; the London merchants and the king's ministers dined and toasted; and the fatal measure was resolved on, to make war for *the king* of Spain.—— I shall be told, perhaps, that it was the choice of the people of Spain to fight for Ferdinand. In answer to this I say; that, when the Spaniards first took up arms, their declarations against France were little less vehement than their declarations against their "*late infamous government*," and against the numerous "*abuses*," that it engendered and maintained. While the people were in this mind, Spanish deputies came to England, and, soon after, at a public feast given to them, the king's minister for foreign affairs gave, in the way of toast, "His most Catholic Majesty Ferdinand VII," which, as I remarked at the time, amounted, considering from whom it came, to a declaration, that, if we gave any aid to the Spanish cause, it would be upon the condition of that cause being the cause of kings in general, and of the king of Spain in particular. That this or something very much like this was the language of the Deputies, or whatever else they might be called, who were sent to Spain, with a view of offering the people assistance, there can be little doubt; and, when our king came formally to appoint a representative of himself to go to Spain, that representative was appointed, not to the Spanish *nation*, or to the *Junta*; Oh, no! to nothing short of "His Most "Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand the VIIth." It does, and it did at the time, appear clearly to me, as, I think, it must have appeared to the public in general, that all this amounted to a declaration, on our part, that, unless the war was a war for the king, we would have nothing to do with it; and, that we would, by no means, have any hand in aiding and abetting a democratical revolution. The reader will judge, whether our conduct and language did amount to this; that may be a question; but, if it did, there can be no question, that we were principally instrumental in making the cause a kingly instead of a popular one.—The proclamations of the Junta are now styled "*Royal* Proclamations." They breathe no longer that popular enthusiasm, which characterized the Addresses of the several separate Juntas. They talk of little but the ill-treatment and the rights of that "beloved sovereign Ferdinand VII." whom to restore to the throne appears to be the principal object of the persons in power. They declare, in one of these "Royal Pro- "clamations," that they *never will make peace with Napoleon*, until their "beloved "sovereign Ferdinand be restored to the "throne," than which, I think the reader will allow, nothing could, at such a crisis, be more impolitic; that is to say, supposing long continued despotism not to have totally deprived the people of their senses; for, with what heart could they possibly go to the war, if they were never to have peace but upon conditions, which, however beaten by them, Buonaparte, unless they conquered France itself, might refuse them? The people of Spain, when they took up arms against the French, while they were engaged in expelling the French, declared against their "late infamous government;" and, was it to be supposed, that they would be urged to shed their blood by a declaration, on the part of those who now manage the affairs of the nation, that the object, the ultimate object, of their toils and dangers is to restore that government? ——In the midst of all the melancholy re-

lations that are daily reaching us from Spain; while we see Buonaparte, like the destroying angel, sweeping away armies and spreading desolation over the land, and while we are trembling for fear that the next mail may bring us the sad assurance, that the bodies of some of our own countrymen, friends, and relations, have been trampled beneath the hoofs of his horses: in the midst of these tidings, is it not enough to sting one to madness to be gravely informed, that, on the 14th of November, "his excellency DON JUAN HOOKHAM FRERE," upon being introduced to the Central Junta, delivered a speech, in which "he stated "the extraordinary complacency and flattering satisfaction, which he felt in the "honour granted him by the king, his "master, in appointing him his representative *near* the august person of his most Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand VII?" It really makes one's feet and fingers itch; it sets one all in a twitter, to read this, at a time like the present. "*Near* the august person," indeed! Why, what more could we do, were we to study for years how we should furnish food for ridicule in the French newspapers?——Of a piece with these proceedings was the proclamation to check "the *licentiousness* of the press," of which proclamation it is by no means difficult to guess the origin. It was so exactly according to the taste of certain people; it was so like them; it was the very thing one would have expected from them. Keep the people down. Keep their tongues and pens in order. Don't let them talk too much. Well, according to all appearances, the Junta may now issue as many proclamations as they please against "the *licentiousness* "of the press:" for, it is to be feared, that they will soon have little else to do.——My decided opinion is, that the present disasters in Spain have chiefly, if not wholly, proceeded from the change of feeling in the people, produced by the change of language in their leaders. It was always obvious, to those who reflected upon the matter, that Spain, to avoid the embraces of the Buonapartes, must be thrown into a state of revolution; *revolution* or *King Joseph* appeared to be the only choice for the nation; and, unfortunately, those who obtained the lead, resolved *not, at any rate, to have a revolution*. They resolved not to suffer "the *li*-"*centiousness* of the press." I, for my part, shall always think of that. I know what sort of folks those are, who talk about "the *licentiousness* of the press" in this country and in America; and upon this knowledge I do, and must, form my judgment.——As to the conduct of our ministers, in their *military* arrangements, I am not disposed to find fault with it. The Morning Chronicle does, indeed, use some very powerful arguments to show, that they might have acted more for the benefit of the Spanish cause; but, the worst of it is, these arguments come after the event. It was all along quite clear, that *we* could do nothing, unless the Spaniards themselves were in great force, as to numbers at least; but, it would now seem, that the French have the superiority even in that respect. Therefore, the accounts, which we before received, about their numbers, were false, or those numbers have, *of late*, diminished, which diminution, if that be the case, must, I think, be attributed to the change, which, by the altered language of the Junta, has been produced in the minds of the people. The blame, due to the ministers, appears to me to be that of having *royalized*, if I may use the word, the Spanish cause. This is a subject well worth the serious attention of Parliament; but, as to the military part of their measures, it will be very difficult, I imagine, to make any blame *stick* to them.——I could not help observing, in the Courier newspaper of Saturday last, a letter, said to come from one of our officers in Sir David Baird's army, who, after complaining of the *lukewarmness* of the Spanish people, and their backwardness to make exertions against the enemy, says, "this is a miserable people, *the French must* "*do them good.*" I really did wonder to meet with a sentiment like this last, in a ministerial newspaper. You see, how things strike even our officers. This gentleman seems to have a high opinion of the *benefits* of French fraternization. Is it any wonder, then, if great numbers of the Spaniards are of the same opinion? No, no: say what we will, it does not necessarily follow, that the French must be hated by the Spaniards, because we wish it to be so.—— I do not yet give up the Spanish cause as lost, because the great dangers of the country may rouze the *people*; a truly revolutionary spirit may arise, and, in that case, the French may be defeated; but, if a king at all, there is, I think, but little doubt, that Joseph Napoleon will be that king.

DAVISON has, at last, been tried. He has been found *guilty*. Well, this is something; and now, I hope, that *refunding* will follow, that the poor abused and cheated people may obtain, from this proceeding, a little, at least, towards defraying the expenees of the *Boards of Commissioners*,

which have been created for the purpose of detecting and bringing to light such frauds upon the public purse. Without *refunding*, I think little of the prosecution, or the verdict. Squeeze the *purse*, that's the way to make them feel. "I squeeze you, "sponge, and you are dry again."——I shall be very anxious to hear the result of these proceedings. If I were a member of parliament, I would never rest, 'till I had the pounds-shillings-and-pence picture of the whole affair clearly before the public. ——DAVISON is, however, a person, after all, it seems, of a most *excellent character*. His sponsors, upon this occasion, were numerous. I marvel that he did not bring his corps of "*Loyal North British Volunteers*," who inhabit about St. James's Square. He is famed for his *loyalty*; and, really, little frauds upon the public, if committed by so *loyal* a man, might meet with a lenient construction. Who knows but that he might have been tempted to add now and then a pound to the price of his articles, for the sake of acquiring the means of raising Volunteers, in order to keep out the French, and to keep down the wicked and seditious at home? We are told, indeed, by the disaffected, that the detected peculators are all famous for their loyalty; for their attachment to "regular govern- "ment, social order, and our holy religion." But, while the truth of this is, and must be, confessed, it may be answered, that loyalty, like every other lofty virtue, subjects the possessor, or, more properly speaking, the professor, to the charge of some petty vices. Besides, who is to be loyal *for nothing?* Godliness, we are told, is *great gain*; and, is there to be no gain attached to loyalty? Is a man to be loyal, while others are disloyal, or while others are said to be so, which answers his purpose full as well, if not better, and is he to get nothing at all by it? The loyalty of my little friend, THOMAS FITZGERALD, the small-beer poet, is almost proverbial. He has written more verses against Buonaparte than any man living. If the Corsican's carcass had been assailable by doggerel, he would have been killed long ago by my little friend, whose attacks upon him have been truly bloody-minded. Accordingly, little Thomas has *a pension of one hundred and fifty pounds a year*, duly paid him out of the fruits of the people's labour. The disaffected may say, that the pay ought to have followed the service, and that Thomas's pension should not have begun, 'till after he had killed Buonaparte; but, with their leave, this is not fair. Soldiers are not paid thus. What is to support the loyal man, while his work is going on? Mr. Dallas is an able lawyer, I have heard; but, he did not, I think, sufficiently dwell upon the uncommon loyalty of his client.——The newspapers state that Sir Andrew S. HAMMOND, Sir Evan NEPEAN, Mr. HUSKISSON, the *Right Honourable* Charles LONG, the *Honourable* WELLESLEY POLE, and LORD MOIRA, gave *evidence* to Davison's *character*, and, I dare say, not without quite sufficient reason. Why, under the late ministry, Lord Moira made him *Treasurer of the Ordnance*; and, now I think of it, I was threatened with a prosecution for a libel, because one of my correspondents inveighed most bitterly against the project, then much talked of, of making him a *baronet*. "Sir Alexander Davison "and the heirs male of his body lawfully "and loyally begotten!" I am in tribulation for his corps of Volunteers. They will now be just like sheep that have lost their shepherd. Aye, the disaffected may sneer; but, St. James's Square may yet rue the day when loyalty thus suffered in the person of one of its most famous champions.——About the time, just mentioned; that is to say, the time of the baronet project, I remember some pompous accounts, that were published of "*grand Dinners*," given by Mr. Davison, to very *distinguished personages*. It would be curious to ascertain the probable cost of one of those "Grand Dinners," the *motive* of giving them being too obvious to become a subject of inquiry with any one at all acquainted with the movement of the wheels of the political machine. I never hear of one of those festivals, without reflecting on the distress and misery, which they occasion. Oh! how many wretched families have spent their winter evenings supper-less and fire-less to furnish the means of carouzing at "Mr. Alexander Davison's *hospita-* "*ble* board," as the paid-for paragraphs in the newspapers termed it! "Hospitable "board," indeed! Are entertainments like these; entertainments furnished from such means; given from such motives; and received upon such implied conditions: are these worthy of the heart-cheering name of hospitality? Where is the sycophant; where is the loyalty-affecting hypocrite; where is even the hired editor or reviewer, who is bold enough to stand forward, and justify this abominable perversion of the use of words? —— For the last three years, the daily press has teemed with paragraphs, praising this now-convicted man. The topics of praise have been of great variety; but, all the paragraphs have had for their

evident object the causing it to be generally believed, that Mr. Davison was a most *liberal* and *loyal* and *benevolent* man. To exhibit all the marks of liberality, loyalty, and benevolence, having such means in his hands, was very easy; and, if the people, in every part of the country, could see to the bottom of things, they would find, that no small part of what they term liberality and charity, is little more than a trifling per-centage of what is derived from their labour and privations. Even the praises, the nauseous printed flatteries of this man Davison, have, in fact, been paid for by the people; by the very people, whom they were written and published to deceive.—— Take this man's wealth; see the amount of it; and then consider how many of those, who now live in misery, it would, if added to their present means, make comfortable. How many hungry bellies the interest of it would fill for ever; in how many families it would change water into beer; in how many fire-less hearths it would make a chearful blaze; in how many cottages it would eke out the scanty day-light of winter. This is the true way, in which to view the effect of these accumulations of the public means, in the hands of individuals; for, disguise the thing how we may, it is luxury, which is the great cause of misery. When the few destroy, by themselves and their idle retinue, a great portion of the products of the earth, there must be less than sufficient for the many. That there must, and ought to be, gradations in society we all know. They are necessary to the very existence of society; but, is it, therefore, necessary or right, that one man should, by the means of *taxes* raised upon the labour of the community, be enabled to consume the fruit of the abour of thousands, and that, too, without any corresponding services rendered to that community? Let us suppose, for instance, that Davison has a fortune of twenty thousand pounds a year, which may be about the mark, and that this fortune has come out of the taxes. This twenty thousand pounds a year is so much taken from the means of enjoyment in the community at large. View it as taken from a hundred gentlemen; each of these have so much the less to use himself, and, of course, so much the less wherewith to give unto them who need. I shall be told, perhaps, that the power of giving and the act of giving, in such cases, only change hands; but, besides that such a change is injurious to the former possessors, the objects of benevolence are also changed. The superfluities of fortune, instead of being used for the relief of unfortunate merit, go to support the idle and the vicious; and, of course, to foster and perpetuate vice.——The splendour of the metropolis, the increase of houses, of carriages, of scenes of amusement, of expences and luxuries of all sorts, in that all-devouring place, have their rise, principally, in causes such as we have now been contemplating. The wealth of the whole kingdom; that part of the fruit of all its labour and industry and ingenuity; that part of these, which ought to go to the providing of assistance to the unfortunate, and to the procuring of a small portion of *general* convenience and pleasure; all that part, is drawn up to the metropolis, through the channel of taxation. One such man as Davison takes away the conveniences and the pleasures and the voluntary alms of several parishes. This is the scourge, under which we smart, and under which we shall smart, till a constitutional reformation in the Parliament take place, till those, whose office it is to take care of the people's money, be no longer suffered to receive from the king's servants a part of that same money.——I know very well, that the general herd, in imitation of that of the forest, will now stand aloof from Davison; will now disclaim him and swear they never tasted of his dinners. But, the people ought to be upon their guard against this; *they* ought to look upon him as one only amongst the numerous herd; *they* ought not to join in any cry against this particular man; *they* ought to be fully aware, that, however great and numerous the frauds that he may have committed, those frauds, all put together, do not amount to a fraud so great and so wicked as the single fraud, now attempted by those, who would make the uninformed part of the people believe, that he is the only, or the greatest, peculator; *they* ought to look upon Davison as a *sample*, rather than a singularity, and to bear in mind the old saying: "as is the sample so "is the sack."

MAJOR HOGAN'S APPEAL.—In another part of this sheet will be found a letter from Major Hogan's *publisher*, from which it appears, that the Major himself is in America, whither he went some time after his pamphlet was published, and whence he is expected to return, in the space of two or three months. This circumstance of the Major's being in America does, indeed, alter the case. It totally does away the ground of that reasoning, whence I drew the conclusion, that his relation, as far as belonged to the Bank Notes, was false. Before we come to such a conclusion, upon such ground,

we must see the Major in England again; or give full time for his agent's receiving his instructions upon the subject. ——There certainly is a good deal of reason, in what the Publisher says, as to an objection to make the numbers of the notes known; but still, I think, it would be safe enough, if there was a proviso for *proving* the property to be that of the claimant.——As to the *probability* of a woman's doing what is ascribed to the "female in a dashing barouche," it is hard to say what is, or what is not, probable amongst such persons. But while the improbability has been urged, on *this side*, it has always appeared very odd to me, that nothing has been said of the improbability, on the *other side*. As to the *fact* of the strumpet's going to the newspaper office and to Frank's Hotel, there can be no doubt, and, indeed, no such doubt has been started. This fact being admitted, we have to inquire, *whether it be probable, that such a woman was employed so to act by Major Hogan?* In the first place, what *motive* could he have for taking so much trouble and running so great a risk? Not to recover his rank in the army, which he had quitted, and from re-entering which he might be well assured, that such a device would, for ever prevent him. There appears to have been no possible motive of gain, which could have actuated him. Revenge, then; *sheer* revenge must have been the motive, if he really did commit the act. Revenge is a very powerful feeling; it will carry a man very far; some men much farther than gain will carry them; indignation, rage at what the party conceives to have been gross ill-treatment from irresistible power, will, I allow, be very apt to set a man's wits to work to find out the means of vengeance, and will greatly tend to make him set risks of all sorts at defiance. But, after all, I cannot see, for my life, how the Major could hope to gratify his vengeance from this scheme. I cannot see, why he should have hoped to do, with this scheme, what might be left undone by the other part of his narrative. Granting, however, that revenge did set him to work, it must be allowed, that he took time to reflect about it; it must be allowed, that there was much of craft and invention in his conduct. Well, then, would such a man readily commit himself to the hands of a strumpet, who, the very day after she had received a reward from him, might, and, in all probability would, betray him for a much greater reward? Was the strumpet his own mistress? Such persons are not famed for their fidelity, especially to gallant men, who are bound across the Atlantic ocean. Besides, there was the "dashing barouche" to *hire*; there were a coachman and a footman to engage to secrecy, a sort of gentry who are not very apt to hold their tongues for a trifle, when they become possessed of saleable knowledge. Major Hogan *must* have been nearly a stranger in London. Was it not a difficult thing for him to set to work and produce this equipage of barouche, lady, and servants? It is, I am told, very easy to trace hundred pound bank-notes; but, would it not have been much easier; nay, is it not much easier now, to trace the barouche, lady, and servants? The *waiter* at the hotel took in the letter. *He* says he took it from such a person, with such an equipage; and, if he was bribed to tell a lie, can it be believed, that, especially now when the Major is gone abroad, he could not be induced to tell the truth? Let it be observed, too, that, if a *sham* lady and servants, it was to such people, that the Major had confided his *four hundred pounds*. Is it probable, that he would have done this? Is it probable, that a man, capable of such a deep-laid scheme, would have entrusted four hundred pounds to such keeping? But, the great thing of all is; the striking fact is, that the lady, barouche, and servants have not been found out, in a town where there is such a police as now exists in London. It is notorious, that the most artful and experienced swindlers cannot, for any length of time, escape this police, the officers of which, when once laid upon the trail, however cold the scent, however stale the haunt, do, ninety-nine times out of every hundred, discover and hunt down their prey. To me, therefore, it is matter of great astonishment, and so, I think, it must be to the reader, that the lady and her equipage have not been yet discovered; that is to say, upon the supposition, that they were hired by Major Hogan. There appears to have been, upon this occasion, as strong motives for the vigilance of the police, as ever existed upon any occasion. No one will doubt of the power of the parties interested to set the police at work. The detection and exposure of the imposture, if it was one, would have been worth fifty millions of the paragraphs of hireling writers, in newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and reviews. Yet, has the police not stirred, that we have heard of; yet, has there been no endeavour, that I have perceived, by a public offer of reward to "the lady or servants" to come forward and make the discovery. This cannot fail to have great weight

with the public, in favour of the truth of Major Hogan's statement. There cannot have been less, supposing the thing to have been an imposture, than six or eight persons in some measure acquainted with it. Major Hogan must have hired the barouche and horses; for what person would have let them to a woman, who could have been engaged in such a service? The two servants must recollect the expedition. The heroine herself together with her companions, or servants, at home. This affair has made so much noise; it has been so long a matter of public conversation; that, one would think it almost impossible, that all these parties should have kept the secret, until this day, especially as there were such strong temptations to a disclosure, and no temptation at all, in any one, except the Major himself, to prevent such disclosure. This was my reasoning before I started the question about the publication of the *numbers* of the bank-notes; but, as that was pointed out to me as quite effectual to ascertain from whom the notes came into the Major's hands; as I could see no reasonable objection, which the Major could have, to such publication; and, as he neither published the numbers, nor took any notice of my hint, I concluded that he dared not try the experiment. But, if it be true, as I must suppose it is, and as I am now, for the first time, informed, that he was gone abroad before my hint was given, this conclusion of mine was, of course, premature.——It is very desirable that the truth of this matter should be ascertained and publicly exposed. If the Major has really trumped up the story about the lady and the notes; if his revenge has carried him so very far, it is proper that it should be known; and, it appears to me, that nothing is more easy than for the police to find out the heroine and the attendants. I cannot refrain from again expressing my surprize, that, upon the supposition of the thing being an imposture, no one of the parties should have yet made a voluntary discovery. They must all have heard of the noise made by their calling at the hotel; the calling there must be fresh in their memory; they must all be aware of the advantage to be derived from turning evidence; the sea is between them and the Major: amongst the vilest of man and woman kind they must necessarily be; and yet, they do not, there is no one of them that does, come forward with a discovery. Supposing, therefore, the thing to be an imposture, there must be, in the composition of these persons' minds, a most uncommon mixture of baseness and of honourable feeling.——On the other side, upon the supposition, that the Major's statement be correct, there is little or no chance of a discovery; for, as my correspondent observes, as to the tracing of the notes, you are liable to be stopped by any one of the possessors refusing to tell how he disposed of them, or any of them; besides which, the possessors may not be in the kingdom, or, if in it, not to be found; to say nothing about the circumstance of people's forgetting, or never looking at, the numbers of the bank-notes that fall into their hands. Then, the woman, if the story be true, having her own carriage and servants, there would be no coach-master to trace her to; and, though the servants of such a person are not likely to be remarkable for their fidelity, they would be under no temptation to betray their mistress, or employer, there being no chance of gaining by their treachery, while there would be a pretty good chance of their losing by it.—— Such is the light, in which I view this matter. I must confess that I felt great pleasure at hearing a sufficient cause assigned for the not publishing of the numbers of the notes; because, I should have been greatly mortified to find, that a gentleman of such excellent character as Major Hogan appears to be; that so worthy a man and so very meritorious an officer, should, though from a sense of ill-treatment, have been induced to go so far as to state and to promulgate, under his own signature, a deliberate and long-intended falsehood.

*** The "POOR WATCHMAKER OF A ROTTEN BOROUGH," in his enumeration of national calamities and disgraces, has overlooked one, which is greater than any of the rest, but which I need not name, when I add, that it is its existence which prevents me from giving to the world his excellent and admirable letter. This is our *curse*; this is our political pestilence. Every word he has said ought to be read by every man in the kingdom. Let us hope, that a time may come, when the public may read this very letter; and, in the meanwhile, let us not fret ourselves much as to what so engages the hopes and fears of the coffee-house politicians. Oh! how gladly would I drag forth the "rascals, who gloss over their treasons "to their country by high-sounding declarations; raising one hand high with "energetic enthusiasm, vowing their eternal "vengeance on the French tyrant, while "the other is actively rummaging the public pocket!" But, I will keep his letter treasured up for the use of family and friends; and I beg him to accept of my best thanks for taking the trouble to commu-

nicate it to me.——This "WATCHMAKER" is a man after my own heart.

Some peculator, who calls himself "*A "Hampshire Man,*" has written me a letter upon the subject of the last Winchester meeting. For the reasons, stated in the beginning of my letter to Mr. Poulter, I shall not insert this letter; though I should, I must confess, be glad to see it published, particularly in this county, as a specimen of the folly as well as the baseness of those, who stand forward as the champions of corruption and peculation.

Botley, Dec. 15, 1808.

MAJOR HOGAN'S APPEAL.

SIR,—Respecting as I do the great talents by which you are distinguished, and still more their bold and independent exercise, any suggestion from you naturally commands my attention.—I therefore feel myself urged to submit a few remarks upon two paragraphs which have lately appeared in your Register, upon the subject of Major Hogan's Appeal. In the first of these paragraphs, you require, upon the suggestion of a friend, that Major Hogan should publish the numbers of the notes, which your friend alleges may in that case be traced with facility; and in your second paragraph, you state, that, "if the Major does this, the "public will believe the account concerning "the notes to be *true*; if he does not, they "will, with very great reason, believe it to "be a most *atrocious falsehood.*" If this story be really false, Sir, I agree with you, as to its atrocity, nay, I should consider even the term *atrocity* as too feeble to describe its character.—But if it be *true*, Mr. Cobbett, in what terms of reprobation would you describe all the hireling scribblers, and scurrilous slanderers, all the newspapers, pamphlets, magazines, and reviews, which have, for the last two months, teemed with such vulgar venom against the reputation of Major Hogan?—This gallant officer's Appeal had not been long before the world, when several persons applied to know the numbers of the notes. But how simple must those who made the application have been, or how simple must they have conceived the person to whom they addressed it, in supposing that it would or could be *safely* complied with, while the agent of Major Hogan stood pledged to give up the notes to any person who could state their numbers. For, if the application had been acceded to, what security existed that some *callous swindler* would not avail himself of the information and immediately stand forward to claim the notes?—The motives that would prompt such a claim are obvious;—first, the claimant would *obtain the notes*, and secondly, he *might secure favour*, by producing such an evidence of *spontaneous* zeal. Such a suspicion you would certainly think excusable, were I to name to you *four*, in particular, of the gentry, by whom the application has been actually made.—But the application of these men, Sir, materially differed from that which you have made: they required a *private* communication; you call for the *publication* of the notes, and with your proposition I am entirely disposed to concur.—Indeed so fully impressed have I been for some time, with the propriety of such a proceeding, in order to remove all doubt, and to facilitate the detection of guilt, that long before your paragraph appeared, I had written to Major Hogan, *strongly advising* him, first to give the notes to some charitable institution, and then to publish the numbers.—But Major Hogan having gone to America, *some time* after the publication of the pamphlet, in order to make arrangements of property with his brother, who is one of the first merchants in the United States; the Major's agent must wait for his acquiescence, before your proposition can be complied with.—The Major assured me, that he would return to England by February or March; before that period, however, I have reason to hope for his answer to my request.—His compliance will, I assure you, afford me much satisfaction, although I do not feel myself in the slightest degree implicated, in any part of the transaction, having received the whole of the statement from Major Hogan, and taking it *entirely upon his faith and credit*, which I have no reason whatever to doubt, as I do not find the authenticity of any of the documents referred to in that publication, has ever been questioned.—Upon this affair of the bank notes, I must, Mr. Cobbett, take leave to say, that I am by no means disposed to adopt the doubts, which seem to exist, as to the *probability* of such an event; for I can easily suppose, that a woman of fashion and intrigue might have quite sufficient motives for doing what is, by Major Hogan, stated to have been done by the person in question.—One of the pamphleteers asks with some air of triumph, "what could have "taken any person to a newspaper office, "to inquire after Major Hogan's address, "which could be so easily known, by ap- "plication at the Horse Guards?"—But the Major, having, some weeks before resig-

his commission, nothing about his address was known at the Horse Guards.—Another pamphleteer asks, why apply at a newspaper office, when the name of a bookseller appeared? But the fact is, that no bookseller's name appeared to the first advertisement, which was published in *August*.

Now, Sir, as to the facility of tracing the notes, I rather think your friend has been too sanguine. To satisfy you of that, I need only refer to the case of Lord Melville, where a committee of the House of Commons, invested with powers, to send for persons, papers, and records, found it extremely difficult to trace any of the notes, and were entirely unable to trace some — Then, Sir, if, with the means which that committee possessed, obstacles arose, how can it be so confidently stated, that it is in the power of any individual, or even of the directors of the Bank of England, to trace the notes, alluded to in Major Hogan's Appeal.—It must be obvious, that any individual may refuse to answer the application of the person or persons endeavouring to trace such notes, and the probability of a refusal to answer, where the answer might betray a party, making an improper application of such notes, is so strong, that I always heard with surprise, have the confident language of those, who talked so much about the facility of tracing these notes.—After all, Mr. Cobbett, let us argue this matter as we may, it must resolve itself into a question of *faith*, and then you are to consider, whether you will attach credit to the words of Major Hogan, recommended as he is, to your respect, by some of the first military characters in the country, or whether you will attend to the mere doubts, surmises, and conjectures, of sycophants in office, and anonymous libellers.—Here let me conclude, Sir, with the repetition of your own words, that "the affair "of the Bank notes has no connection with "Major Hogan's case, which closes before "this affair occurs."—But the motives which urge that meritorious officer's assailants, to dwell so much upon this affair, are quite obvious. The case of Major Hogan is found impregnable, because the grounds of his complaint are undeniable, and therefore, it is thought expedient, by his foes, to fix the public attention as much as possible, upon the business of the Bank notes, because it affords some opportunity for cavilling.

THE PUBLISHER OF MAJOR HOGAN'S APPEAL.

December 6, 1808.

MAJOR CARTWRIGHT, ON THE AFFAIRS OF SPAIN.

Sir,—The Proclamation from Aranjuez, bearing date the 26th of October, and published in the "Times" of the 3d of this instant, fully justifies the conclusions drawn in my letter, inserted in your Register of the 29th of October, touching the patriotic views of the supreme junta; but if virtue herself be too slow in her movements, consequences the most fatal may ensue. As the salvation of Spain depended on the people being made politically *free*, and being *armed*, these were points on which there ought not to have been a moment's hesitation. The very first resolution of the supreme junta, and while the oath of fidelity was warm upon their lips, ought to have been, that a national cortes, equally representing the people, and annually elected by all who contribute to the taxes, should as soon as possible be assembled; and that all the able-bodied of the whole community should be instantly trained for war, and furnished with arms as expeditiously as they could be procured; and to these objects the whole energies of the junta ought, in the first instance, to have been directed.

These being the principles I have uniformly inculcated, they cannot, now that disasters have been experienced, be called afterthoughts; and I could appeal to a Spanish nobleman, for having, in a letter dated so far back as the 21st of June, expressed an anxiety for seeing "the English force with "the best of the Spanish in the service of "their country, *in the Pyrennees*."—What have been in both countries the *causes* of delay, and what may be the fatal consequences, are objects worthy investigation; because a knowledge of them might be highly instructive. No time, however, ought to be lost in attempting to retrieve past errors; and, from the heroism and constancy of the Spanish character, much may be hoped for. If the *mind* of Spain be not subdued, the farther the enemy leads his columns into the country, the sooner perhaps he may be destroyed. I say *perhaps*; for, knowing very little of actual circumstances, I cannot judge what is likely to be the event. We have, however, seen the confidence with which Buonaparte has undertaken the conquest of the Peninsula, at a time when the whole people were apparently hostile, and when every hand that had a weapon would be raised against him. If, under such circumstances, we should see that Peninsula actually subdued, the event must give birth to two reflections, on which we cannot ponder with

too much or too serious attention. *First*, that all the combinations of political and military powers, *applicable to invasion and offensive war*, have, in the French government, attained a degree of perfection far exceeding even those of Rome, and consequently whatever was before experienced among mankind; and that, for resisting the attacks of such an invader, nothing is to be depended on, short of the best combinations of political and military power which are *applicable to defence*. *Secondly*, that that national disease, of which inveterate despotism and habitual slavery are the indications, so breaks down and destroys the constitution, the energies, and the very means and capacities, of a state, that the mere dissolution of its detestable government is by no means a restoration of health and vigour. According to circumstances, its recovery must be a work of time of greater or less duration; as genius and virtue have more or less the ascendant; and as the true spirit of liberty shall be more or less aroused and cherished.

It was at an early period of the struggle, and in my first public letter on Spanish affairs, written on the 15th, and inserted in your Register of July, the 23d, that I used this language:—"If she fail in the attempt, "it can only be, *because she reformed and "armed too late*; AND IF SHE FALL, WE "KNOW WHOSE HARNESS, FOR THE FINAL "CONFLICT, MUST BE NEXT BUCKLED ON." After just remarking, in confirmation of my *second* reflection, that *eight months* have now elapsed since the worn-out government of Spain was annihilated; and *four months* since the French power in the country was in effect broken by the capture of Dupont's army; *which ought to have led to an early contest in the very passes of the Pyrennees*, we in England ought not to lose a moment in effecting those reforms in our own government which, by equally restoring to health and vigour both the civil and military branches of our constitution, shall once more give us those best combinations of political and military power which *are applicable to defence*.

An attorney-general may think it a right season for proposing a statute, abridging the rights of liberty and adding to the severities of law; a court of King's Bench may think it a right season for acting upon most questionable precedents, in committing, for offences in Middlesex, the convicted persons to distant gaols, thereby grievously and calamitously adding to the evils of legal imprisonment, and causing to the parties a heavy expence, although *fine* made no part of the sentence; ministers may think it a season for mocking the nation with a species of tribunal which has all the qualities of a packed jury, and no one attribute of a court of justice or equity; and the great rival parties in the state may still think it a season, for factiously contending with each other for power, but ought not all parties, and all descriptions of men, rather to consider how long it may be, before we ourselves may have to contend with that invader, under whose prowess many are of opinion Spain and Portugal must sink?

Should such an event take place, it would need not the spirit of prophecy to foretel, that nought but reforms, civil and military, completely restoring to us those best combinations which are *applicable to defence*, could save the throne, or government of our country. But when those combinations are at the same time the very essence of our constitution, which, in the strictest sense, is a constitution of *liberty* and *arms*, were it not the first duty of king, ministers, parliament, and people, to restore whatever is in decay, and with one heart and one soul build up again the dilapidated parts of our constitution, and rear again the fallen parts of our liberties, yet, as mere matter of the most vulgar prudence, it should seem advisable, *not to neglect these things until the Iberian peninsula may become French, until the marine of France may double our own, and until the armies of France may be in Ireland or in England.*

But Mr. Miles, in his letter to the Prince of Wales, p. 73, tells us of "a project of "suspending the constitution," which project he attributes to one of whom he says, "the natural despotism of his temper is "well known, and it has lost nothing of "its stern and inflexible ferocity by a resi-"dence in Asia, where it has been most "wofully felt." The reason which the person alluded to is said to have given for his advice, is this, 'that the power of Buo-'naparte can only be effectually resisted by 'a power as despotic as his own.' But there are some objections to this conclusion. First, in the most effective combinations of political and military power, for *offence* and for *defence*, they are radical differences of *principle*. Secondly, neither of the humbled emperors, nor the king of Prussia, were at all deficient in *despotic power*. And, thirdly, if despotism is to be our defence against despotism, we may as well submit at once to that of Buonaparte himself, as that of the adviser, or any other. Nay, it would be more creditable as well as more beneficial: more creditable, because there is less discredit in submitting to a mighty con-

queror, than to any traitorous usurper of contemptible pretensions; and more beneficial, as we should not only be spared the havoc and bloodshed of a contest, but, when once slaves, should at least be governed with transcendant ability.

As I am not, however, likely ever to become a convert to the preachers of despotism, so I must myself continue a preacher of REFORM.

I have remarked, that in the combinations for *invasion* and for *defence*, there is a radical difference. But this requires explanation and qualification. In the present state of society, standing, regular, and highly disciplined armies, are best for *invasion* and *conquest*; but it is only in despotic states that such armies *can* arrive at the magnitude necessary for subduing extensive and potent states; for so long as any nation retains its liberty, its standing army must necessarily be limited in its numbers for the security of that liberty. A *free* nation, therefore, in these days of civilization, is, happily, unqualified for the conquest of other powerful nations. In the rude and ferocious ages prior to civilization it was otherwise; for then the nations most free were most warlike; and countries were not conquered by standing armies, discipline, and military science, but by whole nations of free men pouring into a territory more fruitful than their own, and exterminating or subduing nations less free, fierce, and hardy than themselves. My positions therefore remain unshaken, that in our own age *despotism*, with its unlimited *standing armies*, are the machinery for *invasion*; while *liberty* and the *universal arms-bearing of the people*, are the means of *defence*; always recollecting, that the more universal that arms-bearing of the people, the greater may be with safety the regular army of the country in question.

Nor, Sir, is reform, radical reform, only necessary to our political liberty, and to the preservation of our property from taxation at the will and pleasure of a minister, for corrupting parliamentary supporters, and for enlisting an immense army of *civil* mercenaries for the support of his power, to be paid out of the pockets of the betrayed and injured people; but it is necessary for restoring discipline and vigour to every department of the state; that our affairs abroad as well as at home may not be conducted with imbecility, and our national efforts end in disappointment, and cover us with disgrace. In "A Short English Tale," written in answer to Major Hogan, it is made an *apology* for the commanders-in-chief, in not always selecting proper men for command, that *parliamentary influence must be yielded to*. Here, is the bane of our affairs! Here is the canker-worm preying on the vitals of the state! This, Sir, is "the accursed thing" we must "take "away," or in the day of trial "we can-"not stand before our enemies."—— I remain, Sir, &c.—J. CARTWRIGHT.—— *Enfield, Dec. 12th*, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE.—*King of England's Declaration against France. Dated Westminster, Dec. 15*, 1808.

The overtures made to his majesty by the governments of Russia and of France have not led to negociation: and the intercourse to which those overtures gave rise being terminated, his majesty thinks it right thus promptly and publicly to make known its termination.—The continued appearance of a negotiation, when peace has been found to be utterly unattainable, could be advantageous only to the enemy.—It might enable France to sow distrust and jealousy in the councils of those who are combined to resist her oppressions: and if, among the nations which groan under the tyranny of French alliance, or among those which maintain against France a doubtful and precarious independence, there should be any which even now are balancing between the certain ruin of a prolonged inactivity, and the contingent dangers of an effort to save themselves from that ruin; to nations so situated the delusive prospect of a peace between Great Britain and France could not fail to be peculiarly injurious. Their preparations might be relaxed by the vain hope of returning tranquillity; or their purpose shaken by the apprehension of being left to contend alone.—That such was, in fact, the main object of France in the proposals transmitted to his majesty from Erfurth, his majesty entertained a strong persuasion.—But at a moment when results so awful from their importance, and so tremendous from their uncertainty, might be depending upon the decision of peace or war, the king felt it due to himself to ascertain, beyond the possibility of doubt, the views and intentions of his enemies.—It was difficult for his majesty to believe, that the emperor of Russia had devoted himself so blindly and fatally to the violence and ambition of the power with which his imperial majesty had unfortunately become allied, as to be prepared openly to abet the usurpation of the Spanish monarchy; and to acknowledge and maintain the right

assumed by France, to depose and imprison friendly sovereigns, and forcibly to transfer to herself the allegiance of independent nations. When therefore it was proposed to his majesty to enter into negociation for a general peace, in concert with his majesty's allies, and to treat either on the basis of the Uti Possidetis (heretofore the subject of so much controversy), or on any other basis, consistent with justice, honour, and equality, his majesty determined to meet this seeming fairness and moderation, with fairness and moderation, on his majesty's part, real and sincere.—The king professed his readiness to enter into such negotiation in concurrence with his allies; and undertook forthwith to communicate to them the proposals which his majesty had received. But as his majesty was not connected with Spain by a formal treaty of alliance, his majesty thought it necessary to declare, that the engagements which he had contracted, in the face of the world, with that nation, were considered by his majesty as no less sacred, and no less binding upon his majesty, than the most solemn treaties; and to express his majesty's just confidence that the government of Spain, acting in the name of his catholic majesty Ferdinand VII, was understood to be a party of the negotiation.—The reply returned by France to this proposition of his majesty casts off at once the thin disguise, which had been assumed for a momentary purpose; and displays, with less than ordinary reserve, the arrogance and injustice of that government. The universal Spanish nation is described by the degrading appellation of "the Spanish "Insurgents;" and the demand for the admission of the government of Spain as a party to any negotiation, is rejected as inadmissible and insulting.—With astonishment as well as with grief his majesty has received from the emperor of Russia a reply, similar in effect, although less indecorous in tone and manner. The emperor of Russia also stigmatizes as "insur-"rection," the glorious efforts of the Spanish people in behalf of their legitimate sovereign, and in defence of the independence of their country; thus giving the sanction of his imperial majesty's authority to an usurpation which has no parallel in the history of the world.—The king would readily have embraced an opportunity of negotiation, which might have afforded any hope or prospect of a peace, compatible with justice and with honour. His majesty deeply laments an issue, by which the sufferings of Europe are aggravated and prolonged. But neither the honour of his majesty, nor the generosity of the British nation, would admit his majesty's consenting to commence a negotiation, by the abandonment of a brave and loyal people, who are contending for the preservation of all that is dear to man; and whose exertions in a cause so unquestionably just, his majesty has solemnly pledged himself to sustain.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—*First Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Vittoria, Nov. 9, 1808.* (Continued from p. 928.)

The marshal duke of Dantzic advanced against them, and broke through their centre. The 58th and 32d regiments distinguished themselves upon this occasion.—Had these events occurred in the plains, not a man of the enemy would have escaped; but the mountains of St. Andero and Bilboa are almost impassable. The duke of Dantzic pursued the foe during the whole of the day in the passes of Valmaseda.—In these various affairs, the enemy have lost, in killed and wounded, from 3500 to 4000 men.—The duke of Dantzic particularly praises the generals of division Laval and Sebastiani, the Dutch general Chassey, colonel Lacoste, of the 27th regiment of light infantry, colonel Baco, of the 63d regiment of the line, and the colonels of the regiments of Baden and Nassau, upon whom his majesty has conferred rewards.—The army is abundantly supplied with provisions, and the weather is very fine.—Our columns are marching forward, and combining their movements. It is supposed that the head-quarters will move forward to-night from Vittoria.

Second Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 12.

The duke of Dantzic entered Valmaseda, in pursuit of the foe.—On the 8th, general Sebastiani discovered the rear-guard of the insurgents posted upon a high hill to the right of Valmaseda: he immediately advanced against them, defeated them, and took about 100 of them prisoners.—In the meantime, the city of Burgos was occupied by the army of Estremadura, consisting of three divisions. The advanced guard was composed of Walloons and Spanish guards; and the students of the universities of Salamanca and Leon, divided into several battalions, and some regiments of the line, with other corps raised since the insurrection of Badajos, made the whole of the army amount to little short of 20,000 men. The command of the cavalry of the army was given to marshal the duke of Istria; and the emperor confided the command of the second corps to marshal the duke of Dalmatia.—On the

10th, at day-break, the latter marshal marched at the head of the division of Mouton, to reconnoitre the enemy. On reaching Gamonal, he was received with the discharge of thirty pieces of artillery. This was the signal for advancing at the pas de charge; the infantry of the division of Mouton attacked them, supported by the artillery. The Walloons and Spanish guards were defeated at the first outset. The duke of Istria, at the head of his cavalry, attacked them in flank. The enemy were completely routed; 3000 of them being left dead on the field. We took twelve pair of colours, twenty-five pieces of cannon, and 3000 prisoners. The remainder were completely dispersed. Our troops entered the city of Burgos intermixed with the enemy, and the cavalry pursued them in all directions.—This army of Estremadura, which had come from Madrid by forced marches, whose first enterprise was the assassination of their unfortunate general count Torres, and which was completely equipped with English arms, besides being in the pay of England, is no longer in existence. The colonel of the Walloon guards, and a considerable number of the superior officers, are prisoners. Our loss was very inconsiderable, consisting only of 12 or 15 killed, and at most 50 wounded; only one captain was killed by a cannon ball.—This affair, which we owe to the excellent dispositions of the duke of Dalmatia, and the intrepidity with which the duke of Istria led on the cavalry, does the greatest honour to the division of Mouton; though it is well known that this division consists of corps whose name alone has for a long time been a title of honour.—The castle of Burgos has been occupied, and was found in good condition; it contained considerable quantities of flour, wine, and grain.—On the 11th the emperor reviewed the division of gen. Bonnet, and immediately detached it towards the entrance of the passes of St. Andero.—The position of the army, this day, is as follows.—The marshal duke of Belluna is in close pursuit of the remains of the army of Gallicia, who are flying in the direction of Villarcayo and Reynosa, towards which points the duke of Dalmatia is also marching. They can have no other resourse than that of dispersing in the mountains, with the loss of artillery, baggage, and every thing that constitutes an army.

Third Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 13.

The army of Gallicia, which fled from Bilboa, is pursued by the marshal duke of Belluno, in the direction of Espinosa; by the marshal duke of Dantzic, in the direction of Villarcayo; and at Reynosa is surrounded by the marshal duke of Dalmatia. Important events must take place in that quarter.—General Milhaut, with his division of cavalry, has entered Palencia, and has sent off detachments towards the outlets of Reynosa, in pursuit of the park of artillery of the army of Gallicia.—The young students of Salamanca, who thought to accomplish the conquest of France, the fanatical peasants, who already dreamed of plundering Bayonne and Bourdeaux, and imagined themselves led on by all the saints, being misled by the treacherous monks, are dispossessed of their foolish fancies. Their despair and dismay are at their height. They deplore the misfortunes of which they are become the prey, the lies which they have been made to believe, and the struggle, without an object, in which they are involved.—The whole plain of Castille is already overspread by our cavalry. The zeal and ardour of our troops enable them to perform journies of fourteen or fifteen miles a day. Our piquets are on the Duero. The whole coast of St. Andero and Bilboa completely swept of the enemy.—The unfortunate city of Burgos, a prey to all the miseries of a town taken by storm, trembles with dismay. Priests, monks, inhabitants, fled upon the first news of the battle; terified lest the soldiers of the army of Estremadura should attempt to defend themselves in the houses, which resolution they probably made known beforehand; first plundered by these, and afterwards by our soldiers, who entered the houses, in order to drive out their enemies, and found there no inhabitants.—Such men as M. Von Steine, who from want of troops of the line, which our eagles could not oppose, form to themselves the exalted idea of raising the people in a mass, have become witnesses of the misfortunes which they have brought upon themselves, and of the small obstacles which such auxiliaries can oppose to regular troops.—At Burgos and in its neighbourhood, wool to the value of thirty millions has been found, which his majesty has caused to be sequestrated. All of it that belongs to the monks, and to those persons that have formed a part of the insurrection, shall be declared forfeited, and shall be first set apart for the indemnification of the French, for the losses which they have sustained; for in the city of Madrid, Frenchmen, who had been settled there even for forty years, have been robbed of every thing, and the Spaniards who were true to their king have been declared emigrants. The property of Azanza, a most virtuous and intelligent minister; of Masseredo, a most experienced seaman; of

O'Farril, the best soldier in Spain, has been exposed to public sale. The property of Campo Alanje, respectable for his virtues, his rank, and his fortune, the proprietor of 60,000 Merinos, and of three millions of income, has been the prey of these infuriated men.—Another measure determined upon by the emperor, is the confiscation of all the goods of English manufacture, and of all the colonial produce which has been disloaded in Spain since the period of the insurrection. The merchants of London have thus done very well in sending their goods to Lisbon, to Oporto, and to the Spanish ports. The more they shall send, the greater will be the contributions which they will pay us.—The city of Palencia, governed by a worthy bishop, has received our troops with affection. That city suffers none of the miseries of war. An honest bishop, who, animated by Christian charity, fulfils the precepts of the gospel, and from whose lips nothing but honey distills, is the greatest blessing which Heaven confers upon man. An intemperate, odious, and infuriated bishop who preaches up nothing but rebellion, uproar, disorder, and war, is a curse whom God in his anger gives to mankind, to mislead them in the very source of morality itself.—There is a great number of monks confined in the prisons of Burgos. The peasants throw stones at them. —"Wretches!" said they to them: "It is "you who have plunged us into this abyss "of miseries. Perhaps we shall never again "behold our unfortunate wives, our dear "children. Wretches! a just God will pu- "nish you in Hell for all the miseries which "you have caused to our families, and our "native country."

Fourth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 15.

Yesterday his majesty reviewed the division of Marchand, filled up the vacancies with the most deserving officers, and distributed rewards to the soldiers who had distinguished themselves. His majesty is extremely well satisfied with those troops who have cheerfully marched, without halting, from the Banks of the Vistula.—The duke of Elchingen has marched from Burgos. This morning his majesty reviewed his guards on the plains of Burgos. His majesty afterwards inspected the division of Dessolles, and made appointments to all the vacancies in that division. Important events are at hand; all the troops are in motion. Nothing can be done in war without following a well concerted plan Among the prisoners there were some who had engraved on their buttons a fallen eagle, pierced by two arrows, with the inscription—"To the conqueror of France." In this ridiculous gasconade the countrymen of Don Quixote may be recognized.—Worse troops cannot be found, whether employed on the mountains or in the plains. Clownishly ignorant, foolishly obstinate, cruel towards the weak, mean and cowardly towards the strong. Such is the spectacle they exhibit to us. The monks and the inquisition have bewildered this nation.—Ten thousand light cavalry and dragoons, with 24 pieces of cannon, marched on the 11th, to fall upon the rear of the English division, which was said to be at Valladolid. These brave troops advanced 34 miles in two days, but our expectations were frustrated. We have entered Palencia and Valladolid, and have pushed on six miles further—still none of the English, but prospects and assurances of finding them.—In the meantime, it appears certain, that a division of their troops have been disembarked at Corunna, and that another division entered Badajos in the beginning of this month. The day on which we shall meet them, will be a festival for the French army. May their blood dye that Continent which they have desolated by their intrigues, their monopoly, and their horrible selfishness. Would they were, instead of 20,000, 80 or 100,000 strong, then would the English mothers learn what are the miseries of war, and the English government would no longer continue to sport with the blood and the lives of the people of the Continent! The greatest falsehoods, the basest means, are practised by English machiavelism, to mislead the nation; but the great body of the people is good; Biscay, Navarre, Old Castile, and even the greatest part of Arragon, are animated by an excellent spirit. The nation in general views with profound sorrow the abyss into which it has been endeavoured to plunge it, and will therefore curse the cause of so many evils.—Florida Blanca, who was at the head of the insurgents, is the same who was minister under Charles the Third: he has always been the sworn enemy of France, and a zealous partizan of England. It is to be hoped that in his last days he will acknowledge the errors of his political life. He is an old man, who, to the blindest attachment to England, joins the most unbounded religious superstition. His confidents and friends are fanatics and stupid monks.—Tranquility is restored in Burgos and its environs. The first moment of fury has been succeeded by confidence. The peasants have returned to their villages and resumed their labours.—His majesty the emperor is with his guard at Burgos.—

General Milhaud is marching with his division upon Palencia. General Lasalle has taken possession of Lerma.—Thus, in an instant, have the armies of Gallicia been defeated, dispersed, and partly annihilated, notwithstanding that all the corps of our army have not yet come up. Three-fourths of the cavalry, and almost one half of the infantry, remain behind.—The army of the insurgents exhibited the most singular contrast. In the pockets of the officers who were killed were found lists of companies, having some of them the name of Company of Brutus, and some of them Company of the People. There were companies of students, and others that had the names of saints. Such were the military bands that composed the insurgent army of the peasants. Anarchy and confusion—these were what England sowed in Spain. What will she reap from them? The hatred of this brave people, when they are once enlightened, and under a good government; for the rest, the extravagance of the leaders of the insurgents is every where notorious.—Among the standards that have fallen into our hands are some bearing a representation of the lion of Spain tearing in pieces the imperial eagle. And who are they that have indulged in such emblems? The worst troops that are in Europe.—The cavalry of the army of Estremadura could not even so much as face us. The instant the 10th regiment of chasseurs came in sight of them, they were put to the rout, and were no longer to be seen.—The emperor reviewed the corps of the duke of Dalmatia previous to its marching from Burgos in pursuit of the rear of the army of Gallicia. His majesty has made various promotions, distributed rewards, and is extremely well satisfied with the conduct of these troops. He has expressed his satisfaction to the conquerors of Medina, Rio Seco, and Burgos, the marshal duke of Istria, and generals Merle and Mouton.

Fifth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 16.

The fate of the army of Estremadura has been decided on the plains of Burgos. The Gallician army, beaten in the battles of Durango, Guenes, and Valmaseda, has been dispersed in the battle of Espinosa. This army was composed of the ancient Spanish troops which were in Portugal and Gallicia, and which quitted Porto towards the end of June, the militia of Gallicia, Asturias, and Old Castile, of 5000 Spanish prisoners, which the English had clothed and armed at their expence, and disembarked at St. Andero, of the volunteers of Gallicia, &c. of the regiments of artillery, and of the troops which the traitor Romana had carried away from the north. This army had the presumption to attempt cutting off our communication with Biscay. For ten days it was driven from post to post; at last, on the 10th of November, it arrived at Espinosa, where, in order to save its artillery, magazines, &c. it formed in order of battle, as it believed, in a situation not to be forced. At three o'clock in the afternoon, marshal Belluno arrived in front of the enemy; general Paethod was ordered to carry a small battery occupied by the troops of the traitor Romana. This position was excellent, and defended by their best troops, but general Paethod, with his corps, fell upon these troops, who had abused our confidence, and broken their oaths. In an instant they were broken, and precipitated down the pre ipices. The princess's regiment was destroyed. The enemy made several attacks, in all of which they were defeated. During the night both armies remained in their positions.—Whilst this was taking place, the duke of Dalmatia marched towards Reynosa, the only retreat of the enemy. At break of day the enemy were attacked, both on the right and left, by the dukes of Dantzic and Belluno, while general Maison advanced against his centre; the enemy fled, throwing away his arms and colours, and abandoning his artillery. The duke of Dantzic took at Reynosa their artillery, magazines, and baggage, and made some prisoners. Thus the enemy have been turned not only in Reynosa, but at Palencia; 60 pieces of cannon have been taken, 20,000 men killed or prisoners; two Spanish generals killed. All the succours in arms, &c. sent by the English, have fallen into our hands. Blake saved himself by taking to the Asturian mountains. Romana, with a few thousand men, is marching towards St. Andero. Our loss is trifling in these combats, not exceeding 80 killed, and 300 wounded.—We have not lost any officer of distinction.

Sixth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 18.

Of the 40,000 men who composed the army of Gallicia, part has been killed and taken, and the rest is dispersed. The remains arrive daily at our posts. The general of division Debelle has taken 500 prisoners in the environs of Vasconcelles.—Col. Taschen, who commands the 1st regiment of chasseurs, attacked the escort of the Spanish Gen. Acevedo; the troops who composed the escort having made some resistance, they were all put to the sword.—General

Bonnett, with his division, fell in with the head of a column of fugitives, consisting of 2,000 men; they were partly taken and partly destroyed.—The mashal duke of Istria, who commands the cavalry of the army, entered Aranda on the 16th at noon: our advanced parties of horse go on the left as far as Soria and Madrid, and on the right to Leon and Kamora.—The enemy evacuated Aranda with the utmost precipitation, leaving behind them four pieces of cannon. A considerable magazine of biscuit, 40,000 quintals of grain, and a large quantity of clothing, were found in that town.—At Reynosa numerous English effects were found, and a considerable quantity of provisions of every description.—The inhabitants of Montana, and of the whole plain of Castile, which extends to Portugal, and of the province of Leon, detest and curse the authors of this war, and earnestly demand peace and repose: 20,000 bales of wool, worth from 15 to 20 millions, which were seized in Burgos, have been sent to Bayonne.

Seventh Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 20.

By the 16th the van of the Marshal Duke of Dalmatia entered St. Andero, and found there a large quantity of flour, ammunition, and British goods.—The bishop of St. Andero, animated r ther with the spirit of the devil than that of the gospel, is always marching with a cutlass by his side; he has taken shelter on board the English frigates. The cavalry of Gen Lasalle has pushed its advanced posts as far as Sorne Sierra. The regiments of Zamora, and of the Princessa, which formed part of Romana's division, are almost entirely annihilated. Some Spanish officers, of the regiments of Zamora and Princessa, who were in the north, and who escaped from Zamora, were made pri soners. "You took an oath of allegiance to the king," said some one to them. They acknowledged they did. "You have violated your oath." "We only acted in obedience to our general." "You formed a part of the French army, and you recompensed the kindest treatment by the most infamous treachery." They again replied: "That they were under the orders of their General, and that they had only obeyed him." "You might have been disarmed," it was observed, "and perhaps that measure ought to have been adopted. But reliance was placed on your oaths. It is more to the glory of the emperor to have to fight you, than to have been induced to a step which might have been censured for too much mistrust. You are no longer protected by the laws of nations, which you have violated. You ought to be put to the sword. The emperor condescends to pardon you a second time." For the rest, the regiments of Zamora and Princessa have suffered most severely. Very few of them were left with their colours.

Eighth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Burgos, Nov. 22.

The Duke of Dalmatia is following his successes with the utmost activity. A convoy of artillery, ammunition, and English muskets was taken in the port of Cunillar, the very moment the ships were on the point of getting under weigh.—Gen. Surrat, at the head of his brigade, continues vigorously to pursue the enemy. He has passed Montuna, and entered Asturia. The light companies of the 30th regiment have seized, in the port of Santillana, an English convoy, laden with sugar, coffee, cotton, and other colonial commodities. The number of English vessels, richly laden, which have been taken on this coast, amounts, already, to twenty-five. The 7th corps of the army of Spain, commanded by Gen. Gouvion St. Cyr, has also begun preparations. On the 6th of November, the place of Rosas was invested by Generals Reille and Peno, and the heights of St. Pedro were carried by the Italians. A large number of Miquelets and English occupied the port of Silva; they were attacked by General Fontana, at the head of three battalions of light infantry, and dashed into the sea, with the loss of ten 24 pounders, four of which were English, which they had not time to embark. On the 8th, the garrison of Rosas made a sortie in three columns, protected by the guns of the English ships. General Marechelli killed 600 of them, and repulsed the rest. It is supposed, that the head-quarters will be removed from Burgos in the course of the night.

Ninth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Aranda, Nov. 25.

The military system seems to have been as follows:—On the left was the army of Gallicia, one moiety of which was composed of troops of the line, and of all the resources of Gallicia, Asturia, and Leon. In the centre was the army of Estremadura, which the English corps had promised to support, and which was composed of all the resources of Estremadura, and the neighbouring provinces.—The army of Andalusia, Valentia, New Castile, and Arragon, stated to amount to 80,000 men, occupied, on the 20th November, Calahoria, Tudela, and the borders of Arragon. This army supported the right of the enemy, and was composed

of the troops who formed the camp of St. Roch, and of the whole force of Andalusia, Valentia, Carthagena, and Madrid. It is against this army the French troops are now manœuvring: the rest having been dispersed and destroyed in the battles of Espinos aand Burgos.—The head-quarters were removed on the 22d from Burgos to Lerma, and on the 23d from Lerma to Aranda.—The Duke of Elchingen marched on the 22d to Soria; the town was disarmed, and a committee of well-disposed persons appointed for the administration of the province. The duke is now in Medina Celi, and his light troops scour the road from Saragossa to Madrid.—On the 22d the Dukes of Montebello and Cornegliano formed a junction near the bridge of Lodosa.—On the 24th the Duke of Belluno removed his head-quarters to Vente Gornez. Almost all the roads of communication between Madrid and the northern provinces are intercepted by our troops, whose light parties have picked up a great number of couriers and mails.—The utmost confusion seems to prevail in Madrid, and the whole nation anxiously desires the restoration of that tranquillity and peace, of which Spain has been deprived by the puerile arrogance and criminal cunning of a few intriguers.—It appears difficult for any army which forms the right of the enemy, and is now on the banks of the Ebro, to fall back on Madrid, and the south of Spain.—The events which are now preparing will probably decide the fate of this other moiety of the Spanish army.—For these three days we have had damp and hazy weather. This season is more hurtful to the natives of the country than to men accustomed to the climate of the north.—Gen. Goueson St. Cyr continues vigorously to push on the siege of Rosas.

Tenth Bulletin of the French Army of Spain, dated Aranda de Duero, Nov. 26.

It appears that the Spanish forces amount to 180,000 effective men.—80,000 effective men, making 60,000 men under arms, who composed the armies of Gallicia and Estremadura, and were commanded by Blake, La Romana, and Galuzzo, have been dispersed and put *hors de combat*.—The army of Andalusia, Valencia, New Castile, and Arragon, commanded by Castanos, Penas, and Palafox, and which likewise appeared to amount to 80,000 men, that is, to 60,000 under arms, will, in a few days, meet its fate. The marshal duke of Montebelio has received orders to attack it, in front, with 30,000 men, while the dukes of Elchingen and Belluno are already posted on its rear.—The remaining 60,000 effective men may amount to 40,000 under arms, 30,000 of whom are in Catalonia, and 10,000 at Madrid, at Valencia, and in other garrison towns, or in motion.—Before he proceeded a step beyond the Duero, the emperor resolved to annihilate the armies of the centre and left, and to inflict a similar fate on that of general Castanos on the right.—This plan once executed, the march to Madrid will be but a promenade. This grand design must, before the present moment, have been accomplished. With respect to the corps of Catalonia, which is composed, in a great measure, of the troops of Valencia, Murcia, and Grenada, these provinces being threatened, will withdraw their troops, that is, if the state of the communications will permit. At any rate, the 7th corps, after the conclusion of the siege of Rosas, will give a good account of them.—At Barcelona, general Duhesine, with 15,000 men, and supplies for six months, answers for that important place.—We have said nothing of the English forces. It seems that one division is in Gallicia, and that another made its appearance at Badajoz, about the end of last month. If the English have any cavalry, we must have perceived it; for our light troops have almost reached the frontiers of Portugal. If they have infantry, they probably have no intention to employ it in behalf of their allies; for it is now thirty days since the campaign was opened; three large armies have been destroyed; an immense quantity of artillery is taken; the provinces of Castile, La Montano, Arragon, Soria, &c. are conquered; in a word, the fate of Spain and Portugal is decided, and nothing is heard of any movement of the English troops.—At the same time, one-half of the French army is not yet arrived. Part of the 4th corps of the army, the whole of the 5th and 8th corps, six regiments of light cavalry, many companies of artillery and sappers, and a great number of men belonging to the regiments which are in Spain, have not yet passed the Bidassoa.—In truth, and without doing injustice to the bravery of our soldiers, it may be asserted that there cannot be worse troops than the Spanish. Like the Arabs, they can lurk behind houses, but they have no discipline, no knowledge of manœuvres, and it is impossible for them to make any resistance in a field of battle.

(To be continued.)

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